Posner vermeule accommodating emergencies
Political, cultural and social restraints, they argue, have been more effective in preventing dictatorship than any law.The executive-centered state tends to generate political checks that substitute for the legal checks of the Madisonian constitution. Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, and is the author of Law and the Limits of Reason, Mechanisms of Democracy, and Judging Under Uncertainty, and is the co-author with Posner of Terror in the Balance.Or, if they are, we’ve known about it anyway for centuries so it’s not worth talking about anymore. Today divide and rule is a strategy applied in many different domains. It is perhaps key instrument, for which the wary must keep lookout in all its multiform Swiss-knife guises: nationalism, battle of the sexes, between-generations baiting, etc.Since the 1970s many people – not just political scientists – have grown accustomed to discussing political matters using game-theoretic terms and formalism.On June 5, 2013, the world learned that the National Security Agency (NSA), America’s largest intelligence-gathering organization, had been gathering the metadata of all the phone calls made by Verizon customers since early April 2013.The next day, two prominent newspapers reported that PRISM, a top secret NSA program, had been vacuuming up customer data from some of the world’s largest and best known information technology (IT) firms—including Google, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft—directly from their servers.Here – believe it or not – is a quite useful piece of work by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule.‘Divide and Conquer’ does not contribute much new analytically.
The UN World Food Program, and private NGOs and international aid agencies including CARE, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch, publicly and successfully advocated military intervention (‘peacekeeping operations’) with the declared purpose of providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to famine victims.
The ratchet theory and the panic theory have become fixed points in the debate about emergency powers, yet have escaped rigorous analysis.
As we will show, both theories suffer from insuperable conceptual, normative, and empirical difficulties.
There are two main views about the proper role of the Constitution during national emergencies.
We label them the "accommodation" view and the "strict" view.